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Sociopragmatic failure can be explained from a cognitive viewpoint in terms 
of differences in the specific knowledge internalized by interlocutors about 
the expected behavior in a particular situation. The aim of this paper is to 
show that this specific knowledge is essential for a correct understanding of 
conversations in which apparently no relevant information is transmitted. 
Each social or cultural group establishes procedures for carrying out 
different speech acts or for creating or modifying relationships among its 
members. Phatic utterances must therefore be understood as indispensable 
elements within the sociocultural conventions according to which a group 
operates. They transmit relevant information in such a way that the speaker 
who uses them follows a set of internalized assumptions that indicate to her 
the behavior considered correct in a particular situation. This has clear 
implications for the L2 class, where students can accumulate information 
about the correct behavior in certain contexts and avoid sociopragmatic 
failures. 
1. Introduction 
According to Thomas (1983:84), pragmatic failure is the inability to 
recognise the illocutionary force of a certain utterance when the speaker 
intended that the hearer should recognise it. This author states that there are 
two types of pragmatic failure. On the one hand, pragmalinguistic failure 
occurs when the illocutionary force assigned to a linguistic token by a native 
speaker of the language differs from the illocutionary force assigned to it by 
a non-native speaker of the language. On the other hand, sociopragmatic 
failure originates when different perceptions of what constitutes a correct 
linguistic behaviour in a particular communicative situation come into play. 
                                                     
1 I would like to thank Mary O’Sullivan for her interesting comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper. 
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In my opinion, Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995) 
offers a new and enriching viewpoint that can help us understand in a better 
way both types of pragmatic failure. This paper will focus only on some 
aspects of sociopragmatic failure, and its aim will be to show that the 
knowledge of cultural conventions regarding interlocutors’ behaviour in 
some communicative situations is essential for a correct understanding of 
conversations in which, apparently, no relevant information is transmitted. 
This paper is organised as follows. Firstly, some of the basic 
postulates of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995) are 
summarised. Secondly, different studies on phatic discourse, including some 
within the framework of Relevance Theory, are contrasted in order to 
characterise this linguistic behaviour and show its importance. Then, in the 
light of Relevance Theory, an account is given of what happens when 
sociopragmatic failures arise from the incorrect use of phatic utterances. 
Finally, some conclusions for L2 classes are drawn. 
2. Relevance Theory and communication 
As mentioned above, before dealing directly with sociopragmatic 
failure, it would be convenient to introduce briefly some of the postulates of 
Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995). According to this 
theory, communication is an ostensive-inferential process in which the 
interlocutors’ mutual cognitive environment is modified by means of an 
intentional stimulus produced by the speaker. That stimulus can make 
mutually manifest a certain set of assumptions. The task of the hearer is to 
discover what the speaker intended to say, what she intended to imply, and 
her intended attitude to what was said and implied (Wilson, 1993). 
In the inferential processes occurring in communication the 
addressee combines the assumptions made mutually manifest with the 
assumptions that he has stored in his cognitive mechanism, a subset of which 
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constitutes what Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) term context2. Each 
individual has a set of assumptions that forms his scientific or cultural 
knowledge, which is the result of his being part of a certain society 
(Kempson, 1988:15). He also has another set of common sense assumptions, 
information about the different people with whom he has a relationship, 
about the different ways in which verbal interaction is carried out in his 
culture, and so on. 
Individuals engaging in ostensive-inferential communication do not 
only have to identify the semantic content of utterances to understand them. 
They have to see whether utterances achieve contextual effects when 
combining the new information they receive with the old information they 
have already stored in memory, as well as the type of effects achieved3. 
However, obtaining those effects involves processing effort4. Utterances 
producing a large number of contextual effects with low processing effort 
will be very relevant, whereas those that do not will be irrelevant or achieve 
a low level of relevance.  
Human beings are endowed with a criterion that allows them to 
evaluate the interpretations of utterances. This criterion is powerful enough 
to eliminate all the possible interpretations of an utterance but one, which is 
the one that the speaker will have intended to communicate. This 
interpretation is inferred by means of a non-demonstrative process of 
inference. As Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) state, human cognition is 
relevance-oriented: individuals have expectations of relevance and they pay 
attention to information that seems relevant to them. The principle of 
relevance says that “Every act of ostensive communication communicates a 
                                                     
2 One of the main contributions of Relevance Theory is the conception of context as a mental 
construct formed by a chosen subset of all the information stored by an individual in his brain 
during his life. His whole set of mental representations constitutes his representation of 
reality. 
3 Contextual effects can be of one of three types: strengthenings of previously stored 
information, contradictions of previously stored information, or contextual implications, 
which result in the achievement of new information that can only be achieved by means of the 
interaction of both new and old information. 
4 Processing effort depends on factors such as the effort of memory to construct or retrieve a 
suitable context in which to process an utterance, or the psychological complexity of 
utterances (Wilson, 1993). 
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presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:158), 
where the presumption of optimal relevance must be understood as follows: 
The set of assumptions I which the communicator intends to make 
manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the 
addressee’s while to process the ostensive stimulus. The ostensive stimulus 
is the most relevant one the communicator could have used to communicate 
I. (Sperber y Wilson, 1995:158) 
Every utterance involves the attraction of the addressee’s attention 
and a certain amount of cognitive effort to process it, which must be offset 
by contextual effects. Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) also suggest a 
criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance, according to which 
the first interpretation of an utterance tested and found consistent with the 
principle of relevance is the only relevant interpretation of that utterance. 
3. The relevance of phatic utterances 
One of the most polemical points of Relevance Theory has been one 
of its basic axioms, namely, that the human mind is a mechanism whose aim 
is to process constantly information that can improve an individual’s 
representation of reality. This implies that communication is reduced to a 
continuous exchange and processing of factual information, whose result is 
the storage of more and better information about certain aspects of reality 
(Mey & Talbot, 1988). Sperber and Wilson’s (1986, 1995) viewpoint is 
clearly cognitive, but it does not leave aside the social aspect of human 
communication. 
Individuals are social beings immersed in complex networks of 
social relationships that constrain their behaviour by means of norms or 
conventions of linguistic use established either implicit or explicitly by the 
greater collective of individuals with whom they interact. This social usage 
of language reminds us of what Malinowski (1923) defined as phatic 
communion, a type of linguistic behaviour whose aim is to keep sociability 
among individuals by means of “[...] language used in free, aimless, social 
intercourse” (Malinowski, 1923:476). This behaviour is present in the 
different formulae of greeting and farewell, in expressions of preference, in 
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narrations about trivial or irrelevant matters, in comments about things that 
turn out to be completely obvious, in questions about the wellbeing of 
interlocutors, in references to the weather; in sum, in what has been 
commonly called small talk.  
Many authors have pointed out that the aim of phatic utterances is to 
avoid silence during conversational exchanges and, therefore, to keep talk 
going on (e.g. Drazdauskiené, 1995; Jakobson, 1960; Marcus, 1981; Tannen, 
1984). Others have underlined their low informational content (e.g. 
Abercrombie, 1998; Coulmas, 1981). In these cases these utterances do not 
lack propositional content but, according to Leech (1983:141), violate the 
maxim of quantity of Grice’s Cooperative Principle, since, the 
conversational contribution is not as informative as required by the purpose 
of the conversation. A wrong interpretation of Sperber and Wilson’s (1986, 
1995) model could lead us to assume at first sight that the information these 
utterances transmit is of little relevance, since they do not result in the 
recovery of interesting contextual effects that offset the processing effort 
incurred by the addressee, for the information they convey is too obvious. 
However, the contextual effects that can be obtained by means of phatic 
utterances can be either the strengthening of previously held beliefs or the 
derivation of contextual implications in the form of either weak or strong 
implicatures (Sperber & Wilson, 1986:199) about aspects of the social 
relationship existing between the interlocutors. 
Phatic utterances fulfil an important function in the process of 
satisfaction of individuals’ needs for social cohesion and mutual 
acknowledgement. As Leech put it, they are used “[...] to extend the 
common ground of agreement and experience shared by the participants” 
(1983:142). Individuals’ merely instrumental or transactional exchanges are 
also organised around interactive aims that go beyond the transmission and 
reception of only factual information. These aims include the establishment, 
modification or destruction of interpersonal relations and the constant 
definition and redefinition of the identities of participants in communicative 
exchanges. For this reason, the central topic and the selection of content of 
this type of conversations, which could seem to be apparently trivial, tend to 
be “[...] non-controversial, and to concentrate on the attitudes of the 
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speakers, rather than on matters of fact” (Leech, 1983:142)5.  
Within the framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986, 1995), Žegarac (1998) states that phatic communication exists as a 
social institution, and can also be institutionalised in two different ways, 
either by standardisation or by conventionalisation. On the one hand, 
standardised phatic expressions keep their linguistically encoded meaning, 
which contribute to the transmission of non-phatic information. As Laver 
(1975) has shown, this information tends to be indexical – i.e. about 
participants’ social attributes – and it is obtained as weak or strong 
implicatures, depending on the speaker’s attitude. On the other, 
conventionalised phatic expressions do not keep their linguistic meaning. 
Rather, it is suppressed, leaving only encyclopaedic information about the 
type of context in which the conventionalised expression is normally used.  
Nevertheless, both standardised and conventionalised expressions 
provide hearers with encyclopaedic information about their usage and 
interpretation in the form of assumptions about the typical contexts in which 
those utterances must be processed to achieve optimal relevance. This means 
that they help hearers select a context in which phatic interpretations would 
be derived. Phatic utterances result into phatic interpretations, which are 
interpretations conveying implicatures that are inferred from the fact that the 
speaker has made mutually manifest her intention to communicate with the 
addressee. However, this definition of phatic interpretation involves that 
phatic utterances only transmit the speaker’s intention to keep the 
interactional contact with her addressee. This implies a backward movement 
to previous descriptions of phatic communication that leave aside its social 
meaning. 
Nicolle and Clark (1998) have also considered that phatic 
expressions could encode procedural information that constrains the 
inferential processes by which phatic implicatures are derived. These 
expressions could constrain the process of interpretation in two ways. On the 
one hand, they could impose constraints on the selection of mental contexts 
                                                     
5 See Laver (1975, 1981) for a more detailed presentation of the different types of phatic 
utterances in both the initial and final phase of interaction and for a discussion about how 
differences in participants’ status affect the topic selection of these utterances. 
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in which they should be interpreted. However, contexts are selected as 
communicative exchanges take place. Therefore, stating that these 
expressions could only be interpreted in some determined contexts would 
exclude any possibility of their occurrence and interpretation in any other 
context whatever. On the other hand, and this seems more plausible, phatic 
utterances could constrain directly the inferential computations carried out 
with mental representations. Conventionalised and standardised phatic 
utterances could encode the information that the addressee of the utterance 
should begin its processing deducing first phatic implicatures.  
The criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance states 
that the process of interpretation of an utterance ends when an interpretation 
is found and tested consistent with the principle of relevance. Therefore, an 
addressee would process firstly the phatic implicatures of an utterance and 
then, if he discovers that a phatic interpretation is not consistent with the 
principle of relevance, he would continue his inferential path until he obtains 
non-phatic implicatures. In the case of standardised phatic utterances, which 
also codify conceptual information, this means that the explicatures would 
be derived only if a phatic interpretation would not be consistent with the 
principle of relevance. 
Although Nicolle and Clark’s (1998) argument might be true, a more 
accurate picture of the interpretation process of phatic utterances can be 
gained from Sperber and Wilson’s (1986, 1995) notion of strong and weak 
implicatures. Therefore, in many cases of phatic communication, it will be 
the hearer’s sole responsibility to extend the context of interpretation and to 
enlarge his inferential path until he achieves more weak implicatures when 
processing these utterances. These weak implicatures can be about the social 
relationship existing between him and the speaker.  
Moreover, their comments about standardised phatic utterances and 
the derivation of their explicatures contradict some of the basic postulates of 
Relevance Theory. Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) argue that the process 
of utterance interpretation consists of both a modular decoding phase in 
which a logical form is recovered and an inferential phase in which that 
logical form is contextually enriched and developed to a point in which it 
becomes fully propositional. Part of that second inferential phase is the 
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recovery of the explicatures of the utterance, without which comprehension 
cannot take place. Therefore, it would be more likely that whenever a 
standardised phatic utterance is processed its explicatures are derived in 
order to process it. 
4. Specific knowledge and the interpretation of phatic utterances  
As stated above, context plays a crucial role in communication. 
Individuals have in their brain a great number of assumptions that they use in 
communicative exchanges. These assumptions are organised so that some 
are more easily accessible than others. It could be said, therefore, that they 
have a set of mental assumptions that forms their general knowledge, which 
results from their experience and which is derived from their relation with 
the external reality surrounding them. This knowledge enables them to 
understand other people’s behaviour simply because they are also human 
beings (Escandell Vidal, 1996:634). Within that set of representations there 
are smaller sets of related assumptions constituting their specific knowledge, 
which allows them to interpret and take part in actions in which they have 
sometimes been engaged. It diminishes their processing effort. This second 
type of knowledge is structured in frames or schemata, as Escandell Vidal 
(1996:634), Janney and Arndt (1992:32) or Schank and Abelson (1977:41) 
suggest. 
This captures the idea that individuals’ knowledge is organised in 
terms of sets of assumptions that show them stereotypical situations and the 
behaviour expected in those situations as a result of their life experience. 
Individuals, therefore, use these structures of assumptions to predict 
linguistic behaviour and to interpret it because their specific knowledge 
offers them models for the interpretation of the verbal stimuli they perceive. 
Specific knowledge provides them with data about what constitutes  
adequate linguistic behaviour in different situations and it also contains 
information about the type of language that must be used in these situations. 
Thus, it can be concluded that a great part of human linguistic behaviour is 
influenced by this specific knowledge, which varies depending on the 
individuals, as well as on the different social or cultural groups. 
Individuals belonging to a certain group must learn the behaviour 
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considered correct within that group in order to become competent members 
of it. This means that they must internalise a set of social contexts and assign 
them a set of mental representations (Sperber, 1996). The way whereby the 
individuals belonging to a particular society are able to act within it is 
greatly determined by their ability to mentally represent the social context 
surrounding them.  
The specific knowledge about the conventions regarding the 
behaviour expected in conversational exchanges is the key for the correct 
understanding of conversations in which apparently no relevant information 
is transmitted. Each social or cultural group establishes procedures to carry 
out different types of speech acts or to create relationships among its 
members; i.e., each social group establishes a certain sequence of actions 
that allows it to achieve a specific goal (Hayashi, 1994). As Ebsworth, 
Bodman and Carpenter (1996) have shown, in some types of phatic 
exchanges the occurrence of some introductory turns that are determined by 
a sociocultural convention can be observed. In this way, phatic utterances, 
which a priori do not transmit relevant information, should be understood as 
essential elements within the set of conventions according to which a 
community operates.  
Apart from the social information that can be conveyed by them as 
weak or strong implicatures, the information these utterances transmit is 
relevant in the sense that the speaker communicates that she follows a series 
of internalised assumptions that tell her the adequate or expected behaviour 
within a particular social or cultural group. In the cases of cross-cultural 
communication in which sociopragmatic failures arise, participants can be 
said to be in the same situation, but they act following different behavioural 
rules which have been internalised in agreement with those that the social 
group they belong to has established as being the correct ones for that 
specific situation. When non-native speakers use phatic utterances or 
sequences that do not have an equivalent in the target culture, or when those 
utterances or sequences are missing, they could make manifest to their 
addressees an unwanted set of assumptions and, consequently, addressees 
could recover unintended implicatures. This happens because a different 
mental frame or schema has been activated. By clause (b) of the presumption 
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of optimal relevance – which entitles speakers to look for the utterance that 
can communicate their informative intention in the most straightforward way 
– it can be concluded that the selection of the phatic utterance or sequence 
has not been adequate, since it has resulted in the addressee’s recovery of 
unwanted implicatures. 
By means of phatic utterances a speaker creates phatic implicatures, 
i.e., she shows her intention to socialise with her hearer, her intention to 
maintain, strengthen or cancel an existing social relationship. She also makes 
manifest that she knows the way in which verbal interaction is carried out 
within a society or a certain group. Therefore, when phatic utterances are not 
used in the expected way, hearers may recover a wide array of weak 
implicatures that can have negative consequences for the non-native speaker. 
Since the non-native speaker was expected to use those utterances in a 
particular way in a specific communicative situation and she did not actually 
use them, her addressee may recover on his own responsibility a whole array 
of weak implicatures. Those implicatures could lead him to have a wrong 
perception of the non-native speaker’s personality.  
5. Some implications for the learning of second languages 
The differences existing in the linguistic behaviour among 
individuals belonging to different cultures can be explained, therefore, as 
differences in the type of behaviour considered correct in a particular 
situation. The cognitive viewpoint adopted in this work to interpret 
sociopragmatic failure can be useful in the field of second language 
acquisition and can also help to clarify some cases of sociopragmatic failure 
in cross-cultural conversational exchanges.  
In L2 classes, according to Haidl Dietlmeier (1993), students can 
gradually accumulate information about the value of certain linguistic 
expressions by means of a progressive learning of the inferences and 
assumptions that reflect L2 native speakers’ linguistic behaviour. In the same 
way, by means of that progressive learning students can also get information 
about the correct behaviour in a particular communicative situation and, 
thus, avoid sociopragmatic failure. Learners need explicit teaching to 
evaluate the different parameters intervening in the realisation of some 
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speech acts within a specific sociocultural group. They have to learn when, 
how and with whom they have to behave in a particular way, as well as the 
consequences of their behaviour. That information can only be achieved 
through the development of what Thomas (1983:98) has termed 
metapragmatic ability, or, following Sharwood-Smith (1981:62), through a 
process of consciousness-raising.  
By means of guided discussions, the teacher can help learners create 
a set of mental representations that provide them with information about the 
terms in which interaction in the L2 is carried out. Furthermore, by doing 
this, the teacher can make them aware of some of the unwanted implicatures 
that L2 native speakers could derive from certain linguistic behaviours that 
do not match their own actual behaviour. Nonetheless, he must always 
remember that he must not enforce behavioural patterns associated with a 
specific sociocultural group in the students. Teachers must equip their 
learners with the tools that enable them to communicate in whatever way 
they choose. 
Regarding the usage of phatic utterances, teachers will have to show 
learners that they are crucial for interaction because of the implicatures 
addressees can recover. Students, on the other hand, must understand that by 
means of these utterances they not only transmit their willingness to 
communicate or to socialise with their interlocutors, but they also show that 
they know how to act within the social group that speaks the language they 
are learning. For this reason, in L2 classes reference should be made to the 
value achieved by the different manifestations of small talk and to the fact 
that conversations should not be limited to the transmission of relevant 
factual information, as a wrong reading of Relevance Theory might lead 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995) to think. L2 learners must learn to produce 
in their hearers the social implicatures that phatic utterances implicitly 
convey. 
As in any other learning process, getting the learner to make 
deductions about language use requires much time and implies a certain 
degree of difficulty. Therefore, I think that Haidl Dietlmeier’s (1993) 
suggestion that activities done and topics dealt with in L2 classes should 
allow linguistic interaction in familiar contexts is quite adequate. Thus, 
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topics and activities must be close to real situations, so that learners can 
interact in a natural way close to the reality they will find when they have to 
use the L26. For this reason, in L2 classes more attention should be paid to 
the social acts performed in communication. Phatic discourse plays a crucial 
role in communication because of the implicit contents it transmits, and 
consequently, students should know and value its functions.  
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